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ABSTRACT

How are UN peacekeepers recruited? While we know a lot about UN member states’ general predispositions to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, we know very little about the actual UN force generation process. What role do the UN and its powerful member states play in this process? How do they interact to recruit UN forces? This article seeks answers to these questions by means of an in-depth case study of the force generation process for the UN–AU operation to Darfur (UNAMID). The case study relies on over 50 interviews with high-level decision-makers as well as newly declassified documents from the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. Overall the case study depicts a tantalizing division of labour between the technical expertise of the United Nations and the political power of key UN member states. It appears that UN peacekeeping contributions sometimes require the provision of financial and/or other incentives that go beyond regular UN reimbursements. As a result, powerful UN member states need to step in. However, UN officials play an important brokerage role in this process informing interested UN member states which countries would be suitable for bilateral démarches and why.

Great mystery still surrounds the UN force generation process. As of August 2015, over 100,000 uniformed personnel serve in UN peacekeeping operations.¹ And yet, very little information exists on how these UN forces were actually recruited. A UN pamphlet simply states: ‘[o]nce the mission is authorized, the Secretary-General chooses a Force Commander and asks Member States to contribute troops, civilian police or other personnel’.² Can this be true? Given the political stakes involved in any country’s UN deployment, it sounds improbable that a simple request by the Secretary-General is all it takes to motivate force contributions. Instead, we would expect a politically charged decision-making process – a back and forth between high-level government officials weighing carefully the pros and cons of a particular peacekeeping deployment.

Thus far, the academic literature has largely ignored this process. While excellent research exists on UN member states’ general predispositions to

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¹UNDPKO, ‘Fact Sheet’.
²Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 57.
participate in UN peacekeeping operations, we know very little about the actual decision making with regard to a particular deployment. Questions such as the following remain essentially unanswered: what is the influence of the Secretary-General, the UN Peacekeeping Department (UNDPKO) and powerful UN member states on the recruitment of UN peacekeeping forces? What roles do these actors play in motivating UN force contributions? How do their presence and influence affect potential troop or police contributing countries’ (T/PCC) decisions to deploy? In short, what political factors influence UN force generation? If we are to understand UN peacekeeping, we must find answers to these questions.

Empirically, these questions potentially hold the key to why and how UN member states decide to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Theoretically, they touch upon questions with regard to the division of labour between international institutions and powerful states in world affairs. The bulk of the literature that looks at when and where UN peacekeeping operations deploy highlights the dominance of the UN Security Council and, in particular, the P-5 in the decision-making process. Does this dynamic change when it comes to force generation? Are the P-5 and other powerful states indeed willing to delegate to the United Nations the recruitment of troops for operations they themselves designed?

This article tries to find answers to these questions by examining the force generation process of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). I chose UNAMID as an especially relevant case study because it represents one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations the United Nations has ever launched. Established on 31 July 2007 by UN Security Council Resolution 1769, UNAMID’s core mandate was to bring peace to Darfur. The region had been shaken by ethnic cleansing and other brutal forms of violence. Some people even called it genocide. At the height of its deployment, UNAMID’s strength stood at 17,764 troops, 5,318 police, 313 military observers and 1,097 international civilian personnel provided by the following countries: Nigeria (3,700), Rwanda (3,430), Egypt (2,650), Ethiopia (2,400), Senegal (1,330), Bangladesh (1,080), Tanzania (1,030), Burkina Faso (970), South Africa (850), Thailand (832), Pakistan (796), Jordan (700), Nepal (640), Sierra Leone (400), Gambia (343), China

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3Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers; Cunliffe, Legions of Peace; Sorenson and Wood, The Politics of Peacekeeping; Stähle, China’s Shifting Attitude; Andersson, Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations; Lebovic, Uniting for Peace?; Perkins and Neumayer, Extra-Territorial Interventions. General peacekeeping predispositions and political decisions cannot be confounded. Bellamy and Williams note in this regard: ‘A positive disposition towards the UN or peacekeeping in general does not deter- mine individual decisions about contributing to particular missions; these depend on specific state policies and commitments at particular moments in time. In similar fashion, even states, which are not positively predisposed to UN peacekeeping, might contribute if the right circumstances present themselves.’ Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers, 18.

4UNAMID, ‘Background’.
(323), Ghana (310), Zambia (200), Yemen (190), Togo (150), Indonesia (150), Kenya (90), Mongolia (70), the Philippines (70), Namibia (40), Cameroon (35), Malaysia (35), Burundi (25), Niger (20), Jamaica (15), Fiji (12), and token forces from the United States, Tajikistan, Mali, Germany, Malawi, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Kirgizstan, Guatemala, Iran, South Korea, Ecuador, Italy, Uganda, Palau, the Netherlands and Canada.5

Due to space constraints, this article cannot examine the recruitment process of each one of the T/PCCs listed above. Instead, it focuses on Nigeria, the largest UNAMID troop contributing nation, examining in great detail the consecutive decision-making steps that led to the Nigerian peacekeeping deployment. In addition, the article provides shorter case narratives on the recruitment processes of Rwanda, Egypt, Thailand and Germany. After Nigeria, Rwanda and Egypt provided the largest forces to UNAMID. Thailand and Germany, in contrast, represent outlier cases: Sudanese President Al-Bashir insisted on a predominantly African character of the UNAMID force.6 So how can we then explain that Thailand and Germany were recruited to participate in UNAMID? Finally, I also look at a failed recruitment process: Ukraine was intensely courted to join UNAMID but in the end no Ukrainian forces deployed to Darfur. Why did this happen?

The article relies on over 50 interviews with high-level decision-makers involved in the UNAMID force generation process, including UN staff, UN ambassadors, former ministers and army chiefs of staff of UN member states. In addition, I consulted newly declassified US government documents relating to the Darfur crisis and the UNAMID deployment at the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. The latter documents offer unique insights on how the UNAMID force generation process unfolded.

The findings of the article are four-fold: first, my research reveals that UN officials were not solely in charge of the UNAMID force generation process. Instead, the United States was intensely involved in recruiting forces for the UN–AU operation. On several occasions the US State Department instructed US ambassadors all around the world to petition their host governments for UNAMID force contributions. Once troop pledges were made the United States would follow up by prodding those countries to follow through on their political promises. When UNAMID fell short of specific strategic assets (e.g. helicopters and other transport equipment), the United States would again appeal to foreign governments at the highest levels to make the required contributions. Second, on some occasions the US Government

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5UNDPKO, ‘UNAMID Fact Sheet’; Réseau Francophone de Recherche, ‘MINUAD’.
6The regime in Khartoum was vehemently opposed to a UN operation in Darfur. Nevertheless, in November 2006, at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, the compromise of an AU–UN hybrid operation was forced upon Sudan. One of the conditions inserted into the compromise by Sudan was that UNAMID would have a predominant African character: to the greatest extent possible, first priority in the UNAMID force generation process would go to suitable pledges from African countries. Only if the Africans were unable to meet force requirements would pledges from other troop contributors be considered.
was willing to offer specific *rewards* (i.e. side-payments) to countries if they agreed to deploy. Third, however, the United States did not operate in a vacuum when recruiting forces. UN officials, such as UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan, Jan Pronk, provided the United States with valuable information on which countries to approach for UNAMID force contributions and why. Indeed, these UN officials served as important *brokers* between the United States and potential T/PCCs. Fourth, when it came to the technical specificities of the UNAMID deployment, the UN was almost fully in charge. Indeed, the USA instructed its recruits to bring their capabilities to the urgent attention of UNDPKO in New York and to engage UNDPKO in direct discussions of its precise requirements. UNDPKO would then negotiate with the T/PCCs as to which area of the conflict theatre they would operate, what type of equipment they would provide and what the exact reimbursement rates were for the equipment. UNDPKO also inspected the countries’ equipment prior to their deployment.

Overall, this article thus illustrates that in the case of UNAMID a tantalizing division of labour existed between the United Nations and the United States when it came to recruiting forces for UNAMID. It appears that intrinsic motivations and UN reimbursements were not enough to motivate *all* UNAMID force contributions. Instead, some UN force contributions required the provision of additional selective incentives. Given the UN’s very limited capacity to offer such incentives, the United States was required to step in. The US Government in turn made use of UN officials to gain access to specialized information on interested T/PCCs. In addition, it depended on the UN to orchestrate the technical details of the UN force deployment. The United States thus appears to have played an indispensable role in the UNAMID force generation process but at no point did it operate in an institutional vacuum.

While the UNAMID case study presented here solely highlights US involvement in the UN force generation process, preliminary evidence exists that other countries notably France and Australia have played a similar role in instances of UN force generation; for example, for the UN operations that deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic and East Timor respectively.7

The remainder of the article is structured as follows: it first reviews the existing literature on UN force generation and the setup of UN peacekeeping operations more generally. The second section then delves into the case study of UNAMID. It presents a macro-perspective of the UNAMID force generation process. It explains how the United States turned into the penholder on the Darfur crisis and how it then cooperated with the United Nations to recruit countries to serve in UNAMID. The third section presents a micro-

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7See, for example, Henke, ‘The International Security Market.'
perspective on the UNAMID force generation process. It looks in detail at the force generation negotiation with Nigeria. In addition, it also provides short case narratives of negotiations with Rwanda, Egypt, Thailand, Germany and Ukraine. The fourth section concludes.

What do we know about UN force generation?

Very little information exists on how exactly the UN force generation process unfolds. As mentioned earlier, the UN itself suggests that the Secretary-General and the UN Peacekeeping Department are in charge. Coleman largely seconds this assessment. She argues:

Once the UN Security Council has mandated a UN peacekeeping operation, the task of force generation [...] falls largely to [UNPKO]. Within [UNPKO], the Office of Military Affairs includes a Military Planning Service that produces a Concept of Operation for the mission and derives a list of Force Requirements [...]. The Office’s Force Generation Service negotiates with potential TCCs to secure the military capabilities envisioned in the Force Requirements document. These negotiations cover a host of issues including the number and nature of the troops to be contributed.

This account of UN dominance in the recruitment process for UN peacekeeping operations stands in sharp contrast to what we know about the decision-making process on when and where UN peacekeeping operations deploy. With regard to the latter, the bulk of the existing literature emphasizes the heavy involvement and ultimate power of the United Nations Security Council and, in particular, its powerful five permanent members: the United States; Great Britain; France; Russia; and China. De Jonge Oudraat, for instance, argues:

It is a mistake to think of ‘the United Nations’ as an independent political actor with respect to peace and security issues: it would be more accurate to think of the United Nations as a policy instrument of the organization’s member states. Except for limited actions undertaken by the Secretary-General, such as fact-finding and mediation efforts, member states, led by the P-5, determine when and whether action will be taken.

Durch tells a similar story suggesting that peacekeeping missions ‘require complimentary political support from the great powers and the local parties’ and if ‘either is missing or deficient, an operation may never get underway or may fail to achieve its potential once deployed’.

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8Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers, 57.
11Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 22–3; see also Jakobsen, ‘National Interest; Beardsley and Schmidt, ‘Following the Flag; Mullenbach, ‘Deciding to Keep Peace; Gilligan and Stedman, ‘Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?’ Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? is an exception. Fortna argues that the
As a result, one is left with a puzzle. Theoretically, the control by UN officials of the force generation process makes sense if one follows the academic literature on delegation. Delegating responsibilities to international organizations (IO) is particularly prevalent in two scenarios: (1) if the member states of the IO can benefit from the technical expertise of a specialized agent; and (2) if the member states of the IO can enhance their credibility by delegating authority to a specialized agent.\(^{12}\) Both of these characteristics could apply to UN peacekeeping. As a specialized agent, UNDPKO might have more expertise in raising a peacekeeping force than any UN member state. In addition, UN officials spend considerable time and energy attempting to maintain the image as representatives of ‘the international community’, thus possibly enhancing the credibility (i.e. neutrality) of the operation.\(^{13}\) Nevertheless, critics of delegation theory would emphasize that it is rather implausible that UN member states and, in particular, the P-5 adopt such a hands-off approach with regard to UN force generation. These scholars would instead suggest that UN member states maintain the ultimate control over who deploys and why.

The next section attempts to unravel this apparent paradox. By means of studying the UN–AU operation to Darfur, it tries to examine how powerful UN member states and UN officials interact in UN force generation.

A macro-view on the UNAMID force generation process

Any study of a UN operation has to start with an analysis of the Security Council dynamics that enabled its deployment. With regard to UNAMID, the United States was without a doubt the driving force behind the political processes culminating in its formation. The United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of all UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur crisis and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions.\(^{14}\) The United States was assisted in its political endeavours by the United Kingdom.\(^{15}\) China, on the other hand, served all through 2004–06 as a key ally of the Sudanese regime working against a UN deployment to Darfur.\(^{16}\) Nevertheless, unwilling to let the 2008 Beijing demand for peacekeeping from local actors is just as important as the supply from the international community.


\(^{13}\) Barnett and Finnemore, ‘The Politics, Power.

\(^{14}\) E.g. Cable, Embassy Manila to Secretary of State, ‘The Philippines to Support UNSCR Resolution on Darfur’, 27 July 2004, Darfur Collection, box 2, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.

\(^{15}\) Black and Williams, *The International Politics*, 197.

Olympics be overshadowed by Chinese–Sudanese relations, China changed course in mid-2007. Other countries, in particular, other major powers such as France, Russia, Germany and Japan, showed comparatively little interest in the Darfur crisis. So what explains such intense US interest in the Darfur issue?

**Understanding US interests in Darfur**

Sudan, the largest country in Africa and the country of which Darfur is a region, had been afflicted by civil war almost incessantly since its independence from the British Empire in 1956. That this conflict would become one of the George W. Bush Administration’s top foreign policy priorities came as a surprise to many. On the campaign trail, candidate George W. Bush had not shown any interest in Sudan, nor in Africa. ‘Africa does not fit into the national strategic interests’ of the United States, he was quoted as saying. Nevertheless, shortly after taking office, President Bush dramatically changed his mind, mainly as a result of intense lobbying efforts by evangelical Christians. In the early 2000s, hundreds of US evangelical organizations were operating in Sudan. They were providing humanitarian assistance but often were also involved in an anti-slavery movement that had emerged in the early 1990s in response to the recurring abduction of Christian southern Sudanese to serve as slaves in the Arab Muslim north. Evangelicals were able to multiply political leverage by collaborating with Jewish organizations. Both organizations bonded over the idea of religious prosecution by Muslim regimes. American anti-slavery groups and other African American organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), also joined the lobbying endeavour. For the Congressional Black Caucus, the condemnation of slavery in Sudan was arguably the only issue on which it could easily agree.

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18 This compelled Nicholas Kristof to write in his blog on 11 Sept. 2007: ‘France and Germany, I sympathized with your opposition to the war in Iraq. But are you really now so petty and anti-Bush that you refuse to stand with the U.S. against the slaughter in Darfur, or even to contribute significant sums to ease the suffering? Does the Chirac government really want to show the moral blindness to Sudan’s genocide that the Vichy regime did to Hitler’s?’ Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, 11 Sept. 2007.
19 Huliaras, ‘Evangelists, Oil Companies’, 711.
22 Ibid., 168; Michael Horowitz, a former Reagan administration official and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, was a significant figure in bringing about this alliance. ‘Christians are the Jews of the 21st century’, he claimed prominently in the Wall Street Journal on 5 July 1995, referring to the persecution of Christians in Sudan.
23 Huliaras, ‘Evangelists, Oil Companies’, 170.
24 Interview by author with Charles Snyder, Washington, DC, Mar. 2012.
In addition, the US oil lobby had a stake in the process. Although Chevron had discovered oil in Sudan in the 1970s, Sudan’s oil reserves, which yielded over two billion dollars per year, were off-limits to US companies because of stringent US sanction policies in place since the 1990s. Congressional approval to remove those sanctions would require an end to the Sudanese civil war. Initially, the US Government focused on negotiating a North–South peace agreement. These negotiations, however, soon provoked such a reaction that Darfur, a region in the west of Sudan, also caught fire. The subsequent mass killings in Darfur orchestrated by the government in Khartoum led to the emergence of a humanitarian mass movement in the United States: the Save Darfur Coalition. The meeting that laid the foundation for the movement took place on 14 July 2004 at the City University of New York. By 2007, the coalition had grown into an alliance of more than 180 faith-based, advocacy and humanitarian organizations and disposed of an annual budget of approximately US$14 million. People wore Save Darfur bracelets, played Save Darfur video games and wore Save Darfur T-shirts. By mid-2005, the key objective of the Save Darfur Coalition had become the replacement of a small African Union mission in Darfur (AMIS) with a full-fledged United Nations peacekeeping force. It was this intense domestic pressure that led the US Government to become the political leader of UNAMID.

Overcoming diplomatic hurdles to the UNAMID deployment

A first hurdle to a UN deployment to Darfur was the Sudanese Government’s adamant opposition to such an idea. Khartoum was exceptionally sensitive about the insurgency in Darfur. It did not want other countries or international organizations interfering in this issue. It could tolerate African Union peacekeepers (i.e. AMIS) because it knew they were militarily weaker and also because it maintained a certain degree of political leverage over many African Union governments deploying troops. The Sudanese Government found an unexpected ally in the UNDPKO chief, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who also opposed a UN deployment to Darfur, albeit for an entirely different set of reasons; chief among them was the absence of a peace agreement between the different rebel forces. If there was no peace to keep, why send a peacekeeping force? As a result, on 1 May 2006 – one

27De Waal, War in Darfur.
28Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 22.
29Ibid., 23.
30Lanz, ‘Save Darfur’, 673; Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 41.
32Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur, 111.
day after the *Save Darfur Coalition* had organized mass rallies across the United States – US Deputy-Secretary of State Bob Zoellick was dispatched to Abuja to help the AU negotiate a peace agreement for Darfur. Zoellick did not disappoint; a peace deal was rammed through by 9 May 2006. To further overcome Sudanese opposition, a compromise was found in the form of a hybrid UN–AU force: UNAMID. The United States also threatened Sudan that it would impose sanctions against 31 Sudanese companies if the UN deployment did not go forward.

A second hurdle was to gain Chinese approval for a UN Security Council resolution. As mentioned earlier, all through 2004–06, China served on the UN Security Council as a key ally of the Khartoum regime, working against a UN deployment to Darfur. Chinese corporations were the leading developers of oil reserves in Sudan, and China imported 60 per cent of Sudan’s oil output. With the impending Olympics in 2008, however, China changed course. An impressive NGO-led PR campaign (i.e. ‘Genocide Olympics’) painted China in a bad light and China wanted to avoid any further bad press. In addition, China was helped by the United States, among others, to restore its diplomatic ties with Chad in August 2006. This led to the inking of several oil deals between China and Chad at the beginning of 2007, thus somewhat diminishing China’s dependence on Sudan.

**The force generation process for UNAMID begins**

The UNAMID force generation process began in February 2006, when US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton publicly invited possible mission contributors to indicate their interest in deploying troops to Darfur to the UN Secretariat. A systematic recruitment process subsequently unfolded in which the US Government worked on the political front gaining force pledges often by offering selective rewards to potential T/PCCs while UNDPKO handled the technical follow-ups.

On the US side, the institutions most involved in the process were (1) the State Department’s Political–Military (POLMIL) Bureau; (2) the State Department’s Africa Bureau; and (3) the US Mission to the United Nations. The standard operating procedure worked the following way: the POLMIL and Africa Bureaus drafted together a list of countries to be approached for

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33Ibid., 85.
34Ibid., 127.
35In early 2008, after being criticized for its relationship with Sudan, China also claimed that if not for its lobbying with Khartoum, UNAMID would not have deployed.
38Ibid., 183.
39Holslag, ‘China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvring’, 74.
UNAMID force contributions.\textsuperscript{41} To create the list, the POLMIL Bureau used most often ‘military’ data it had gathered through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme (ACOTA) and its successor programme the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).\textsuperscript{42} ACOTA and GPOI were set up to provide training to African and other military forces to improve their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{43} Through the ACOTA and GPOI cooperation efforts, the POLMIL bureau had acquired an extensive knowledge of the military capabilities of participating African states. The Africa Bureau, in turn, added ‘political’ information, which it had gathered mainly through the US embassy network in Africa.\textsuperscript{44} Once a list of countries was established, the State Department sent out cables to the US embassies in the identified countries, requesting the local ambassadors to undertake so-called débâcles – visits to the local authorities to ask whether the government would be willing to contribute troops. The ambassadors then reported back to the State Department what the exact conditions were for a deployment. The conditions ranged from very basic requests (e.g. airlift to the conflict theatre) to various equipment needs to complex political bargains. Often high-ranking officials in the State Department and the White House (including the Secretary of State and the President) would handle the follow-up on an individual request, either by bringing it up at a bilateral or multilateral meeting (i.e. ’corridor discussion’) or by making a phone call to the leadership of the country in question (i.e. ‘7th floor and NSC calls’).\textsuperscript{45} If US government officials gained a political pledge to contribute forces to UNAMID, they asked their recruits to bring their capabilities to the urgent attention of the UNDPKO in New York and to engage UNDPKO in direct discussions of its precise requirements.\textsuperscript{46}

US involvement, nevertheless, did not stop there. If the US Government learned that political pledges were not fulfilled, it again instructed its

\textsuperscript{41} Input was also solicited from other bureaus. The list was one of the topics of discussion of several high-level meetings inside the State Department.

\textsuperscript{42} ACOTA originated as an Africa Bureau programme in 1997 under the name of Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). President Bill Clinton established ACRI as the first of a whole array of new military programmes aimed at expanding US military activities on the African continent. In 2004, ACRI was expanded and renamed ACOTA. Today the Africa Bureau maintains the policy lead and regional political expertise for ACOTA input, while the POLMIL bureau oversees the budget process and contractors implementing ACOTA training. GPOI extended the ACOTA programmes to countries outside of Africa. GPOI is funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, which is managed by the POLMIL Bureau. It had a budget of $660 million (FY2005–FY2008) to fund potential TCCs’ training and deployment needs. Countries which were beneficiaries of ACOTA or GPOI are not legally required to deploy to peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, it ‘is a process the U.S. encourages’. ACOTA Fact sheet February 2006, 4 November 2012, available online at www.nps.edu/services/usmc/Docs/ACOTA_FactSheetFeb06.pdf?

\textsuperscript{43} Volman, ‘US to Create’.

\textsuperscript{44} Interview by author with Charles Snyder, Washington, DC, Mar. 2012.


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
ambassadors to remind their host governments of what they had promised in earlier discussions. For instance, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan had all made political pledges to the United States to contribute to UNAMID. Indonesia had pledged a 140-person Formed Police Unit (FPU) to North Darfur, Bangladesh a 327-person multi-role logistic unit to South Darfur and Pakistan a 329-person engineer company to West Darfur and a 156-person Level III hospital to South Darfur. All three countries were slow in fulfilling their commitments. Thus, in early October 2008, the US Secretary of State requested its US embassies in Jakarta, Dhaka and Islamabad to ‘contact high-level host government counterparts to assess the readiness of the host government to make good on this pledge to UNAMID. Post should urge counterparts to press forward with key steps in the deployment process’.47

On several other occasions, the United States also provided the United Nations with technical and financial help regarding UNAMID. For example, in February 2006, the US Government offered a cell of US military officials to support UNDPKO planning with regard to the transition from AMIS to UNAMID.48 In November 2006, the United Nations also asked the United States to provide all engineering and camp support for UN personnel working in Darfur.49

UNAMID in need of strategic assets

By early 2008, the key UNAMID force structure was in place. Nevertheless, UNAMID was still lacking strategic assets, such as helicopters and other transport vehicles.50 The lack of these assets severely threatened the deployment of the force. As a result, the United States again stepped up its force generation efforts to rapidly fill the gaps. On 7 March 2008, the State Department sent out an Action Request to the US embassies in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Angola. The cable asked the recipient US ambassadors ‘to approach host government officials at the highest appropriate level to request that they contribute a transport company to UNAMID’.51 At the same time, the US mission to the UN was requested ‘to double-track these requests with military advisers and/or civilian staff of the relevant counterpart missions in New York and with UNDPKO’s Force Generation Service’.52 On 9 May 2008, similar

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48 Letter, John Bolton, US Ambassador to the UN to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General UN, 8 Feb. 2006, Darfur Collection, box 2, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.
49 Fax, Secretariat of the UN to Permanent Mission of the United States to the UN, 6 Nov. 2006, Darfur Collection, box 2, the National Security Archive and Rebecca Hamilton, Washington, DC.
50 Joint NGO Report, UNAMID Deployment.
52 Ibid.
cables went out to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Jordan, Pakistan and Ukraine to request aviation assets for UNAMID. The cable mentioned that ‘the President and the Secretary believe that the [US Government] must exhaust all efforts to secure these assets for UNAMID’. If the embassy thought it necessary, the State Department would again consider ‘senior-level calls’ as follow-ups to the embassy efforts. The USA offered to assist the latter group of countries with upgrading their aviation assets so that they would be able to fulfil UNDPKO requirements. US ambassadors were also specifically instructed to alert their host countries that US government officials would be engaging with UNDPKO to ensure that their air assets were approved for deployment. The US Government was prepared to assist them in their discussions with UNDPKO in support of their aviation contribution to UNAMID.

Role of UNDPKO

In the case of UNAMID, UNDPKO was in charge of most of the technical parts of the force generation process. For instance, it negotiated with the T/PCCs in which area of the conflict theatre they would operate, what type of equipment they would provide and what the exact reimbursement rates were for their equipment. UNDPKO also inspected the countries’ equipment prior to their deployment. In addition, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, regularly briefed the UN Security Council on the latest developments of the UNAMID deployment, highlighting for instance the need for TCCs to provide UNAMID with the remaining shortfalls of specialized military assets such as attack helicopters, transport aircraft and so on. He also negotiated with Sudan so that it would accept the non-African UNAMID contributions.

Surprisingly, the role of UNDPKO did not stop here. Indeed, various UNDPKO and other UN officials served as powerful brokers between the United States and potential T/PCCs. For instance, on 5 November 2007, US Deputy-Secretary of State Negroponte met with UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. At that time, UNAMID was desperately looking for specific aviation assets. Guéhenno pressed the Deputy-Secretary for further US assistance in acquiring these capabilities. ‘Failure of UNAMID would undermine hard-won progress in reestablishing confidence in UN peacekeeping’, Guéhenno opined. ‘Without additional non-African units, UNAMID will not prove significantly more capable at

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
force projection than AMIS.’ When Negroponte asked about possible candidates for force contributions, Guéhenno mentioned South Africa, Nigeria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Brazil. Guéhenno, however, also stated that ‘only South Africa and Nigeria have a direct interest in the conflict’.57 Earlier in the UNAMID force generation process, UN Special Representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk, had sounded out the high-ranking Indian government official Sanjiv Arora about a possible Indian deployment to UNAMID. India had already deployed 2,400 troops to the UN operation in Southern Sudan (UNMIS). Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi raised the same topic with Arora a bit later in the process. The Indian response (i.e. that India needed to weigh other interests, including its bilateral relationship with Sudan (an important supplier of oil) and strong links with the African Union) was later relayed to the United States.58

A micro-view on the UNAMID force generation process

The following section provides a micro-perspective on UN force generation negotiations. It traces in detail the negotiations that led to Nigeria’s UNAMID deployment. In addition, it provides short case narratives on the negotiations with Rwanda, Egypt, Thailand, Germany and Ukraine.

Force generation negotiations with Nigeria

Nigeria provided the largest troop contribution to UNAMID. Overall, it sent 3,700 Nigerian personnel (including four military battalions, one military hospital, military observers and staff officers) to serve in the UNAMID force. Prior to UNAMID, Nigeria had gradually contributed approximately 2,000 troops to AMIS. Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo had also been involved in the Darfur peace talks as elected chairman of the African Union. Nevertheless, neither Nigeria’s AMIS deployment nor its involvement in the Darfur peace talks fully explains why Nigeria decided to make the largest force contribution to UNAMID. In fact, Obasanjo’s first steps as AU peace broker for Darfur had reflected a pro-Khartoum rather than pro-Darfur attitude. In August 2004, while on a visit to Khartoum, Obasanjo publicly played down any possible military intervention in Darfur.59 Also, on 17 October 2004, Obasanjo attended a meeting between leaders of Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Chad and Nigeria, which concluded that no foreign intervention should occur in

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59Iliffe, Obasanjo, Nigeria, 283.
This anti-intervention attitude resounded well with the Nigerian public. By the early 2000s, the Nigerian population had developed a strong anti-peacekeeping attitude. This view was largely the result of Nigeria’s dire military experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which had cost the Nigerian Government over US$8 billion and thousands of Nigerian lives. A 2000 survey conducted by a researcher from Ibadan University found that 84 per cent of the survey participants considered Nigeria’s involvement in Sierra Leone and Liberia not worth the money spent and believed that the government should focus instead on the socio-economic problems at home. Picking up on this mood, Obasanjo refused to participate in an intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and a UN intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.

With regard to Darfur directly, a Globscan poll in June 2005 revealed that Nigerians did not consider Darfur as being one of the major problems facing the world. Only 8 per cent of Nigerians polled claimed to have great knowledge of the Darfur conflict, 16 per cent a fair amount and 60 per cent had heard little or nothing at all about the conflict. More importantly, the Nigerian army opposed such an undertaking. While the Nigerian military generally liked peacekeeping operations, largely due to the financial incentives involved, in autumn 2004 it felt intolerably overstretched. Overall, the Nigerian military numbered 80,000 troops. In October 2004, 4,000 of those troops were deployed to the UN operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Liberia (UNMIL); another 4,000 were training to replace the battalions in UNAMSIL and UNMIL; two units were designated to the ECOWAS Standby Brigade; a company of military police to Burundi; a company of mechanized infantry and a company of engineers to Benin; and another company to Monrovia. In addition, Nigeria had military observers stationed in South-West Sahara, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). At the same time, 12 battalions (approximately 25,000 troops) were committed internally, including on the Bakassi Peninsula, the Plateau State and the Niger Delta. All three areas were major domestic hot spots with a serious potential to flare up at any moment. General Martin Luther Agwai, then serving as Nigerian Chief of Army Staff, suggested in our interview that another Nigerian deployment was simply impossible – ‘there were no troops, there was no equipment’.

Nigeria’s attitude only began to change because of US involvement. US diplomats first approached the Nigerian Government in pursuit of Darfur in

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61 Iliffe, *Obasanjo, Nigeria*, 218.
63 Ibid.
64 Adebayo, ‘Nigeria’, 266.
65 Because of its ethnic composition, Nigeria is an extremely volatile state almost permanently ‘dancing on the brink’ of civil war. Campbell, *Nigeria*.
66 Interview by author with Martin Luther Agwai, Abuja, May 2012.
mid-April 2004 – very shortly after the conclusion of the first round of the N’Djamena peace talks. The US Government requested Nigeria to reassign monitors from the Peace Verification Monitoring Team operating in Southern Sudan to the Ceasefire Commission in Darfur.67 On 12 July 2004, the newly appointed US Ambassador to Nigeria, Robert Campbell, officially met with President Obasanjo to request Nigerian military support for AMIS. On 19 July, the US embassy in Abuja received a fax copy from the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff General Martin Luther Agwai asking for US assistance with Nigeria’s deployment of a company-sized unit to Darfur. The following specific requests were made: six months’ worth of field rations and/or fresh supplies, fully equipped Level 1 field hospital, petroleum oil and lubricants required to run combat and logistics equipment during the period of deployment, hand-held radios, GPS, VSAT internet connectivity, image intensification goggles, image intensification binoculars and night vision goggles.68 In October 2004, the US Air Force also airlifted 150 Nigerian peacekeepers to Darfur.69

Over the summer of 2004, the situation in Darfur grew increasingly violent and AMIS proved to be utterly inefficient. US diplomats thus approached the Nigerian Government once more, this time requesting them to step up their military engagement in Darfur.70 The United States, however, was aware that Nigeria would not volunteer any more forces. Instead, it required an additional incentive. US diplomats knew that President Obasanjo’s top foreign policy priority in the autumn of 2004 dealt with debt relief. He had indeed declared the latter the key foreign policy goal of his presidency. Most of Nigeria’s US$33 billion debt was held by the Paris Club. It had been accumulated by military governments preceding Obasanjo’s presidency. This debt, Obasanjo had concluded, was a major cause of Nigeria’s failure to develop. Getting rid of it would represent a fresh start, a second chance for a new Nigeria.71 By September 2004, Obasanjo was growing concerned that his plan of debt reduction would not work out. Previous successful examples of debt reductions by the Paris Club (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire, Congo and Cameroon) had shown that debt reduction was granted because of political, not only economic, factors. In all three cases, France had been instrumental in pushing the deals to fruition.72 As a result, Nigeria needed a champion for its cause: the United States. In a

71Campbell, Nigeria, 17–18.
72Moss, ‘Double-Standards’, 22.
speech on 9 September 2004, given at a Nigeria–US investment conference – and thus targeting a US audience – Obasanjo made his point crystal clear; it was pay-back time. The United States wanted Nigeria to be its deputy policeman in Africa? Well, Nigeria in turn wanted the United States to use all of its weight to ensure this debt deal passed. On 2 December 2004, during a meeting with President Bush at the White House, Obasanjo pleaded for US assistance with debt relief; as a follow-up to that meeting, Obasanjo wrote a letter to President Bush containing the following excerpts:

As you are aware, we are actively working on the crisis in Darfur and Côte d’Ivoire whilst trying to stave off the re-emergence of conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. I have invested my personal time and effort in this and committed Nigerian troops and resources to resolving these conflicts. [...] With regard to Nigeria, the one main issue where I would request your support is that of our quest for Debt Relief.

Congruent with directly engaging President Bush, Obasanjo also sent his staff to convince individual members of Congress. Obasanjo wanted the debt deal resolved during the G-8 summit to be held from 6–8 July 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland. In April 2004, a Nigerian delegation met with US Rep. John Boozman (R-AZ), Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL), Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA), Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN), Rep. Diane Watson (D-CA), Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-CA), Sen. Christopher Smith (R-NJ), Rep. Gregory Weeks (D-NY), Rep. William Jefferson (D-LA), Rep. Thomas Tancredo (R-CO), Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ) and Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA). During his meeting with the Nigerian delegation, Rep. Tancredo emphasized what had been Obasanjo’s strategy so far: he promised to make a strong case for the United States to cancel Nigeria’s debt if Nigeria took the lead on the Darfur crisis. Rep. McCollum and Rep. Royce, instead, raised a different issue: the extradition of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president, who lived in exile in Nigeria and who had been indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 17 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Charles Taylor issue was, however, a delicate one for Obasanjo. Obasanjo had personally guaranteed Taylor safety from arrest

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75 Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 The same week that the delegation was visiting Washington, DC, Congress had passed a resolution calling on Nigeria to turn Charles Taylor over to the International War Crimes Tribunal. The United States was also offering a US$2 million reward for Taylor’s capture.
and international prosecution when he still was the de facto president of Liberia. In return, Taylor had agreed to give up the Liberian presidency, leave Liberia for Nigeria and formally allow the Liberian war to come to an end. Obasanjo did not want to backtrack on his promise to Taylor. ‘Nothing should be done to erode the credibility of Nigeria’, Obasanjo staunchly declared during his 5 May 2005 visit to the White House, ‘if I renege on the asylum agreement “nobody will respect us”’. Because Obasanjo did not want to move on the Charles Taylor issue, he had to put all his eggs in one basket: Darfur. On 5 May 2005, Obasanjo again met with President Bush, only weeks before the G-8 summit. The meeting focused on debt relief and Darfur. McClellan, the White House spokesman, summarized the conversation as follows: ‘[t]he President thanked [Obasanjo] for his strong leadership in Darfur and talked about the importance of resolving the situation in Sudan’. In addition, Obasanjo raised the question of debt relief for Nigeria, asking Bush to ‘use his good offices’ to press the issue with his European counterparts. On 30 June 2005, Obasanjo carried the day. The Paris Club agreed to a 60 per cent reduction of Nigeria’s debt. The official agreement was signed in Paris on 10 October 2005. A bilateral US–Nigerian agreement followed on 17 December 2005. The US Government and the White House in particular played crucial roles in the final negotiations. US Ambassador to Nigeria Robert Campbell writes: ‘[d]espite rancorous disagreements among the involved agencies, the White House imposed an interagency policy in support of debt relief for Nigeria’. In response to the debt relief agreement, Nigeria changed its military rotation policy to cope with the new demands of a Nigerian deployment to Darfur. As mentioned earlier, Nigeria’s military was heavily overstretched. Nigerian troops would normally rotate every six months, with six months in the field, six months to rest and train. The new rotation policy entailed that troops stationed in Liberia and Sierra Leone would stay for one year instead. This change freed a substantive number of troops for deployment to Darfur. Nevertheless, Gen. Martin Luther Agwai recalls that the demands on Nigeria troops were still immense: ‘[s]ome soldiers came back from Sierra Leone or Liberia and were sent straight to the Plateau State or the Niger Delta with no rest in between’. 

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79 Hayner and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Negotiating Peace.
80 Michael A. Fletcher, ‘Nigerian Leader Says He Won’t Turn Taylor over for Trial’, Washington Post, 6 May 2005, available online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/05/AR2005050501738.html
81 Ibid.
82 Campbell, Nigeria, 19.
83 Interview by author with Gen. Pennap, Abuja, May 2012. There are also rumours that Obasanjo resolved the controversial dispute with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in an attempt to get troops out of Bakassi and into Darfur.
84 Interview by author with Martin Luther Agwai, Abuja, May 2012.
**Force generation negotiations with Rwanda**

Rwanda served as the second largest UNAMID troop contributor after Nigeria. Similar to Nigeria, its deployment to Darfur cannot be fully understood without US involvement. Indeed, when approached to contribute troops to UNAMID, Rwanda appeared ‘willing but unable’; that is, it shared the security and humanitarian objectives of the operation, but it did not dispose of the necessary military, financial and logistical resources to be an effective UNAMID participant.\(^85\) On 3 September 2008, the United States thus offered Rwanda approximately US$20 million in equipment and transportation support items intended for use by Rwanda’s UNAMID contingent in Darfur.\(^86\) Already prior to this substantial support package, the USA had provided pre-deployment training to five Rwandan battalions during 2006 slated to be deployed to Darfur.\(^87\) The Darfur training and the funding came in addition to the standard annual US$7 million in US military aid to Rwanda. The assistance was channelled through the US-led ACOTA programme.\(^88\)

**Force generation negotiations with Egypt**

Egypt provided the third largest contingent to UNAMID. Nevertheless, in contrast to Nigeria and Rwanda, it volunteered these forces to participate in UNAMID. US involvement was negligible in the Egyptian case. UNDPKO even had to reject Egyptian troop offers (i.e. only one of the three proposed Egyptian infantry battalions ended up participating in UNAMID) because Darfuri rebels had put pressure on UNDPKO not to allow Egyptian troops to come to Darfur. They thought that Egypt was partisan to the Al-Bashir Government in Khartoum.\(^89\) Indeed, Egypt had quite intense intrinsic interests in the Darfur crisis: it relied heavily on Nile water resources and thus was keen on keeping a good relationship with Al-Bashir. In addition, Egypt wanted to show leadership in Africa. Egyptian President Mubarak personally addressed Egyptian troops on 2 January 2008, prior to their UNAMID deployment. In a public statement about the address, presidential spokesman Soliman Awaad highlighted that this peacekeeping contribution was part of extensive efforts by Egypt, Libya, Chad and Eritrea, along with some non-African countries, to ‘put an end to the bloodshed in Darfur’.\(^90\) Prior to the

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\(^87\)Foreign Military Training Joint Report.


\(^90\)Ibid.
Egyptian UNAMID deployment, Egypt had already hosted a conference with Sudan’s neighbouring countries in order to find a solution to the crisis.

**Force generation negotiations with Thailand**

Thailand sent approximately 800 troops to Darfur. Thailand had little to no interest in the Darfur conflict. As a result, the Thai deployment to Darfur also appears to be at least partially related to US involvement. Indeed, following the 19 September 2006 coup d’état in Thailand, the United States had suspended US–Thai military cooperation programmes totalling over US$29 million.\(^9\) It has been suggested to the author that Thailand seized the opportunity that the United States was struggling in 2007 to find UNAMID force contributions to ask for a suspension of US sanctions in exchange for a Thai troop deployment to UNAMID.\(^9\) If this was indeed the case, the strategy appears to have been successful. In February 2008, the USA resumed funding for all Thai military cooperation programmes.\(^9\)

**Force generation negotiations with Germany**

The *Save Darfur Movement* had much less of a following in Germany than in the United States and some other European countries. As a result, Germany’s contribution to UNAMID of a transport aircraft might also have been the result of US lobbying efforts. Andrew Natsios, the US Special Envoy to Darfur, indeed travelled to Germany in September 2007 to bring the Germans on board of UNAMID. During the trip, Natsios met with the chief Foreign Policy Adviser to German Chancellor Merkel and the foreign policy head of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU). Natsios tried to make the case that if the Darfur problem was not resolved, the whole region would fall apart. Natsios did not, however, think that the Germans bought the argument. Instead what the Germans wanted was to improve bilateral relations with the United States after Iraq.\(^9\)

**Force generation negotiations with Ukraine**

Finally, Ukraine represents a case that illustrates the limits of US lobbying efforts for UNAMID force contributions. By mid-2007, the key UNAMID force structure was indeed in place. Nevertheless, UNAMID was lacking strategic assets, such as helicopters and other transport vehicles, which limited UNAMID’s force projection. Sudan had rejected potential T/PCCs which

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91 Chanlett-Avery and Dolven, *Thailand*.
92 Interview by author with John Blaxland, Australian Military Attaché to Thailand, Canberra, Nov. 2011.
93 Chanlett-Avery and Delven, *Thailand*.
could have provided such assets.\textsuperscript{95} The US State Department recommended Ukraine to fill the gaps. The key rationale behind this thinking was that Ukraine was one of the very few countries in the world that possessed a significant number of transport helicopters. Moreover, the United States maintained a very close relationship with the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko. In 2004 the United States had supported Yushchenko during the ‘Orange Revolution’ against his opponent Viktor Yanukovych.\textsuperscript{96} The United States saw in Yushchenko a pro-reform, pro-Western figure. After the ‘Orange Revolution’, the United States had poured money into Ukraine to help reform government institutions as well as Ukraine’s economic system. The United States had also been instrumental in Ukraine’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in May 2008, and had also lobbied hard to get Ukraine into NATO.\textsuperscript{97}

Nevertheless, in early 2008, when Ukraine was approached by the United States to support UNAMID, the Ukrainian Government was a broken institution. On 26 March 2006, Ukraine had held parliamentary elections, which were won by Yanukovych’s party, the ‘Party of the Regions’, and Yushchenko was forced to appoint Yanukovych as Ukraine’s Prime Minister. Yanukovych openly defied Yushchenko, refusing to implement Yushchenko’s presidential decrees. Ukraine’s key preoccupation in 2008 was the overheating of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine suffered from excessive inflation amounting to over 30 per cent, high short-term external debt relative to reserves and high exposure of banks to foreign funding.\textsuperscript{98} It was feared that soon the Ukrainian banking system would collapse. As a result, Ukraine appealed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an emergency loan. To the dismay of the Ukrainian Government, the IMF insisted on attaching stringent conditions to the loan such as further reform of the Ukrainian economy, in particular, the liberalization of gas prices, which so far had been kept artificially low. On several occasions, Ukrainian government officials appealed to the United States to put a word in for Ukraine to abate IMF conditionality.\textsuperscript{99} President Bush visited Kiev on 1 April 2008. He raised the Darfur issue with President Yushchenko himself. Yushchenko’s hands were, however, tied. Any Ukrainian foreign military deployment required approval by the Ukrainian parliament, which in all likelihood would oppose a deployment to Darfur. Indeed, the ‘Party of the Regions’ and the communists had just ended a blockade of the Ukrainian parliament in response to a letter that Prime Minister Tymoshenko, President Yushchenko and Parliament Speaker Arsenyi Yatsenyuk had sent to NATO requesting a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for

\textsuperscript{95}Joint NGO Report, \textit{UNAMID Deployment}.
\textsuperscript{96}Woehrel, ‘Ukraine’, 12.
\textsuperscript{97}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98}‘IMF Approves U.S. $16.4 Billion.’
\textsuperscript{99}Interview by author with US diplomat, Washington, DC, July 2012.
Both parties were strongly opposed to a MAP. Yanukovych himself had threatened to hold public demonstrations against the government’s request for a MAP. As expected, the parliament voted against a Ukrainian deployment to Darfur, and thus US–Ukraine negotiations on Darfur ended.

Conclusion

Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams have argued that there is no general causal explanation of contributions to UN peacekeeping. This article largely confirms this assessment. Nevertheless, based on the examination of UNAMID, this article adds various analytical components to the analysis of UN force generation. Most importantly, this article finds that powerful states can be critical in building a credible UN force.

With regard to UNAMID, the United States bilaterally approached many countries in search of force contributions. On at least one occasion, the United States also offered a side-payment in exchange for a UNAMID troop contribution (i.e. Nigeria). On at least one other occasion, the United States provided substantial financial, material and other logistical aid to enable and enhance a UNAMID deployment (i.e. Rwanda). The cases of Thailand and Germany also suggest that US influence played at least a minimally influential role in the latter two countries’ deployment decisions. Egypt, however, stands out as an important exception. Its deployment appears to have been wholly self-motivated. Ukraine in turn shows the limitations of US power in incentivizing UN troop contributions in case of virulent domestic opposition to a UN troop commitment.

The article, however, also illustrates that the United States did not operate in an institutional vacuum when recruiting forces for UNAMID. UN officials provided important brokerage services linking up potential T/PCCS with the United States. UN officials were also in charge of the technical specifics of the UNAMID deployment. Indeed, the United States specifically asked its recruits to make their intentions known to UNDPKO. UNDPKO would then negotiate with them their area of deployment, the equipment they would provide, as well as what the exact reimbursement rates were for that equipment. UNDPKO also inspected the countries’ equipment prior to their deployment.

The case of UNAMID thus leaves us with a more complex political picture of UN force generation: it appears that UN peacekeeping contributions sometimes require the provision of side-payments and/or other financial, material

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100 Woehrel, ‘Ukraine’, 7.
101 The parliament had only resumed operations after it passed a resolution stating that the parliament would consider legislation to join NATO only after a public referendum approved NATO membership.
102 Bellamy and Williams, Providing Peacekeepers, 5.
and logistical aid which the UN cannot provide. As a result, powerful UN member states need to intervene. UN officials, nevertheless, play an important brokerage role in this process. They can provide specialized information on which countries would be suitable for bilateral démarches and why. These findings thus suggest that an interesting division of labour exists between technical expertise and political power. UNDPKO does possess better know-how on the technical details of raising and deploying a UN force, as well as with regard to T/PCCs’ interests in a specific UN deployment. Nevertheless, UNDPKO falls short of being able to distribute financial and/or other incentives beyond the regular UN reimbursements: it does not have a political tool box at hand such as do powerful UN member states. For example, it is incapable of offering side-payments such as debt relief to potential T/PCCs. In this regard, powerful UN member states have the upper hand and – at least in the case of UNAMID – it was the combination of both the technical expertise and the political tools that determined the success of the force generation process. Finally, UNAMID also provides striking examples of the embeddedness in the local political moment of individual UN troop deployment decisions. Very specific political variables uniquely present at the moment of the force generation process largely determined many of the examined deployment decisions.

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